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  2 Abstract 
The crucial changes brought about by the Lisbon Treaty to the institutions of the 
European Union have affected and re-structured the role of the rotating Presidency. 
This paper examines the extent to which the rotating Presidency still plays a role in 
the EU's external relations. First of all, the multiple roles of the rotating Presidency 
(agenda-shaper, consensus-builder, external representative) are identified based on 
former Treaty provisions and practice. Secondly, the paper focuses on the practice 
of the Belgian (second half of 2010) and the Hungarian (first half of 2011) 
Presidencies, highlighting specific cases during their terms which show that the 
transitional period of the Lisbon system is characterised by uncertain institutional 
questions that may result in controversial issues. The ‘transitional’ rotating Presidencies 
still have the possibility to shape new roles. The paper concludes that the role and 
influence of the rotating Presidency remain; however, a shift towards the EU’s internal 
level through the important role of a consensus-builder can be observed.  
 
 
  3 Introduction 
Among others, the role of the President of the European 
Council “clearly eats into what once belonged to the 
rotating EU Presidency, to which the Lisbon Treaty now 
assigns virtually no role in the domain of external action.”1 
The Treaty of Lisbon (ToL) implemented crucial changes among the institutions of the 
European Union (EU) by appointing new actors with new tasks in the field of external 
relations. These changes affected and re-structured to a great extent the role of the 
rotating Presidency. Therefore, we can no longer talk of a “traditional rotating 
Presidency”,2 and the main question is to what extent does the rotating Presidency 
still play a role in the EU's external relations post-Lisbon? 
Scholars elaborating on the changes of the ToL state that the Presidency’s role, 
according to the ToL, has been reduced and transferred to different EU actors.3 
Nevertheless, the EU’s external relations are a complicated field divided usually 
along the lines of EU and member state competences. The incomplete institutional 
reforms following the adoption of the ToL have complicated the situation in the EU’s 
external relations and it seems that the role of the Presidency depends not only on 
competences and Treaty provisions but also on other features such as member 
states’ attitude and flexibility as well as internal and external uncertainty. In order to 
understand the diverse functions of the rotating Presidency, the paper applies 
different levels of analysis (member state, EU, international) and links these levels to 
various role definitions (agenda-shaper, consensus-builder, external representative) 
derived from former Treaty interpretations and practice.  
Despite the new provisions, the ToL is fairly vague with regard to the new positions as 
well as the roles of the rotating Presidency in external relations.4 This entails that the 
first rotating Presidencies of Lisbon have the possibility to shape ‘new roles’ in the EU’s 
external relations. This paper analyses the practice of the Belgian (second half of 
2010) and the Hungarian (first half of 2011) semesters. Due to the two countries’ 
similar weight in the EU, a comparison of their roles, attitude and flexibility, as well as 
the internal and external uncertainty, can provide a useful example of possible ‘role 
finding’, both for the upcoming Presidencies and other EU institutions.  
                                                 
1 Joint Study of European Policy Centre & Egmont & Centre for European Policy Studies, “The 
Treaty of Lisbon: A Second Look at the Institutional Innovations”, Brussels, September 2010, p. 
142. 
2 Interview with Belgian Foreign Ministry officials, Brussels, 7 May 2011. 
3 Among others Emerson, Kaczyński, Wouters, Duke, Missiroli, etc. 
4 J.-C. Piris, The Lisbon Treaty: A Legal and Political Analysis, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 2010, p. 207. 
  4 The role of the Presidency varies with different fields of external relations. No major 
change in the Presidency’s roles is expected under exclusive EU competence 
(trade); however, increased consensus-building efforts to get everyone on board 
and to involve the European Parliament in the process are required. The cases of 
shared competences prove that member states are sometimes reluctant to transfer 
competences to the EU and, therefore, many conflicting cases arise resulting in grey 
areas that have mainly to do with external representation. Due to the exceptional 
external events and the ‘pre-mature’ institutional structure, the Hungarian 
Presidency’s role was of great importance in matters of Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP), even if only through its supportive and flexible attitude.  
The paper concludes that the EU is still in transition and the Presidency’s ‘changing 
nature’ is thus not yet fully developed in the post-Lisbon system. This ‘transitional 
period’ could serve as a possible modus vivendi for the future but most probably will 
not lead to permanent solutions in external relations. The rotating Presidency’s role 
remains; its influence, however, is shifted more towards the EU’s internal level in terms 
of its important role of consensus-builder. Although one of the main objectives of the 
ToL was to create more coherence and consistency in the EU’s widening external 
relations, the transitional period shows that to gather momentum with this new set-up 
will require more time, more cooperation and clearer separation of powers.5  
 
The EU Presidencies under the Lisbon system 
The Presidency’s roles under the Nice system6 
The rotating Presidency has covered in its functioning the entire field of external 
relations. 7  Its roles under the Treaty of Nice (ToN) consisted of a complex 
combination of drive, coordination, negotiation and representation, both at 
supranational and intergovernmental levels.8 The paper narrows down these roles 
into three main categories illustrative of the three different levels: (1) agenda-shaper 
on the member state level, (2) broker/consensus-builder on the EU level, and (3) 
external representative on the international level.9  
                                                 
5 Interview with EEAS officials, Brussels, 4 April 2011. 
6 For more details see E.M. Szabó: “Background Vocals: The Role of the Rotating Presidency in 
the EU’s External Relations Post-Lisbon”, MA Thesis, Bruges, College of Europe, 2011.  
7 R. Bengtsson,  “The Council Presidency and external representation”, in O. Elgström ( ed.), 
European Union Council presidencies : a comparative perspective, London, Routledge, 2003, 
p. 56. 
8 A.M. Fernandez, “Change and Stability of the EU Institutional System: the Communitarization 
of the Council Presidency”, Journal of European Integration, vol. 30. no. 5, p. 629. 
9 A. Schout & S. Vanhoonacker, “The rotating Presidency: obstinate of obsolete”, Journal of 
Common Market Studies, vol. 44, no. 5, 2006, p. 1055 (levels added by the author). 
  5 The Presidency had evolved continuously and has become an important actor of EU 
affairs through chairing the Council, managing inter-institutional relations and 
representing the EU in the international arena in the complex field of external 
relations.10 If the Presidency had a strong desire to give priority to the national 
dimension as an agenda-setter, its preferred issues usually appeared on the agenda 
while aiming rather for consensus on the EU level.11 Despite the Presidency’s overall 
authority, its role in external representation was not uniform as the EC also had 
powers on issues falling under exclusive and shared competences. Table 1 
summarises the Presidency’s role under the Nice system: 
Table 1 – The rotating Presidency under the Nice system 
Level  Competence/Role  Exclusive  Mixed  CFSP 
Member state  Agenda-shaping Moderate Powerful Powerful 
EU – internal  Consensus-building Moderate  Powerful  Powerful 
International  Representation None  Moderate  Powerful 
Source: author 
The main changes of the ToL 
The ToN failed to provide a clear distribution of competences between the pillars, 
which resulted in a significant amount of uncertainty in the system.12 Therefore, the 
ToL was aimed at creating greater coherence in the EU’s external relations.13 First, 
the 18-month Presidency trio has been formalised through the institutional changes 
of the ToL. The three Presidencies are now obliged to set-up a multiannual 
programme with common priorities, which requires increased coordination and 
preparation efforts from all parties.14  
                                                
Second, a new type of Presidency system with two permanent chairs, at the level of 
the European Council and the ministerial meetings of Foreign Affairs (HR/VP), have 
 
10 S. Bunse, Small States and EU Governance, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, p. 38. 
11 A. Schout & S. Vanhoonacker, “The rotating Presidency: obstinate of obsolete”, in From the 
convention to the IGC – Mapping cross-national views towards an EU-30, Berlin, Stiftung 
Wissenschaft und Politik, 2003, p. 6. 
12 M. Cremona, “Defining competence in EU external relations: lessons from the Treaty reform 
process”, in A. Dashwood & M. Maresceau (eds.), Law and Practice of External Relations: 
Salient Features of a Changing Landscape, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008, pp. 
46-50. 
13 ISIS Europe, “The impact of the Lisbon Treaty on CFSP and ESDP”, European Security Review, 
no. 37, March 2008, p. 2. 
14 S. Van Hecke & P. Bursens, “How to study the (Belgian) EU Presidency? – A Framework for 
Analysis for the Research Network 2010 Belgian EU Presidency”, Workshop ‘Governance in/of 
the EU’, Politicologenetmaal 2010, Leuven, 27-28 May 2010, pp. 7-8. 
  6 been introduced.15 An important change is the division of the former GAERC Council 
into two new formations; the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) is chaired and led by the 
HR/VP and the European External Action Service (EEAS), while the General Affairs 
Council (GAC) remains under the auspices of the rotating Presidency.16 As for the 
preparatory bodies, the former system very much remains as the Working Groups, 
the COREPER and nine out of ten Council formations are prepared and conducted 
by the rotating Presidency (all except for the FAC). 
T h i r d ,  t h e  r o l e  o f  t h e  H R / V P  h a s  b e c o m e  m o r e  c o m p l e x ,  t a k i n g  o v e r  f r o m  t h e  
Presidency as Chair of the FAC, CFSP extraordinary FAC meetings, the coordination 
in international organisations, international conferences and third countries (Art 34(1) 
TEU, Art 221 TFEU), and as CFSP interlocutor with the European Parliament. 17 In 
addition, the HR/VP is partly responsible for harmonising and coordinating external 
action between the Council and the Commission, simultaneously enjoying significant 
representative and participatory roles in CFSP matters.  
The introduction of a catalogue of competences (exclusive, shared, parallel, Art. 2-4 
TFEU) and of a legal personality for the EU (Art. 47 TEU) seeks to enhance its capacity 
to enter into relations with other states and to strengthen its status in international 
negotiations.18 In the absence of EU competence, the competence remains with the 
member states and the rotating Presidency should be in charge of such 
negotiations.19 As the CFSP is “subject to specific rules and procedures”20, the former 
second-pillar was basically retained in its special status.   
The changes of the ToL rewrite the traditional roles and tasks of the Presidency as the 
new ‘chiefs’ are taking over some tasks and roles of the rotating Presidency and 
therefore challenging the old practice.21 The real functioning of the Treaty, however, 
may rest on the practices and precedents set during the transitional period, which 
will be highlighted through various cases during the Belgian and Hungarian 
Presidencies’ mandate.  
                                                 
15 S. Duke, “The Lisbon Treaty and External Relations”, EIPASCOPE, Maastricht, 2008/1, p. 2. 
16 A. Missiroli, & J. Emmanouilidis, “Implementing Lisbon: the EU Presidency’s other (rotating) 
half”, European Policy Centre Policy Brief, Brussels, December 2009, p. 1. 
17 P.M.  Kaczyński & P. ó Broin, ”Two new leaders in search of a job description”, Brussels, 
Centre for European Policy Studies, no. 200, 25 November 2009, p. 2. 
18  M.  Emerson&R.Balfour&T.Corthaut&J.Wouters&P. M.Kaczynski,&T.Renard, Upgrading the 
EU’s Role as Global Actor. Institutions, Law and the Restructuring of European Diplomacy, 
Brussels, Centre for European Policy Studies, 2011, p. 22. 
19 P.M.  Kaczyński, “Single voice, single chair? – How to re-organise the EU in international 
negotiations under the Lisbon rules”, no. 207, Brussels, Centre for European Policy Studies, 
March 2010, pp. 2-3. 
20 Cremona, op.cit., p. 64. 
21 Missiroli & Emmanouilidis, op.cit., p. 1. 
  7 Agenda-shaping 
The ToL has narrowed down the agenda-shaping roles of the rotating Presidency, 
since the introduction of permanent chairs has replaced the former practice of the 
rotating Presidency. As the European Council remains responsible for the political 
leadership of the EU at heads of state and government level, the Presidency has 
suffered serious losses.22 The other permanent chair, the HR/VP, took over most of the 
roles of the Presidency on CFSP issues.23 The EEAS assists and supports its work as well 
as the agenda-setting. Nevertheless, the two new permanent chairs do not imply 
that the Presidency is excluded from the external area.24 As the rotating Presidency is 
still in charge of certain meetings25, it can still exert its influence on the agenda via its 
chairing position.26 The only remaining body  under the chairmanship of the rotating 
Presidency in CFSP is the COREPER II, which has an important bridging function to 
ensure coherent action.27 In the case of trade and environment, not much has 
changed with regards agenda-shaping: working groups and the COREPER level are 
both chaired by the Presidency. Table 2 shows the chairing roles of the Presidency 
according to competences.  
Table 2 – The Presidency in external relations 
  Trade  Environment  CFSP 
European Council 
Chair of the European 
Council 
Chair of the European 
Council 
Chair of the European 
Council 
FAC   Rotating Presidency  HR/VP HR/VP 
PSC -  -  HR/VP  Representatives 
COREPER II  Rotating Presidency  Rotating Presidency  Rotating Presidency 
Preparatory bodies, 
working groups 
Rotating Presidency  Rotating Presidency  Mainly EEAS 
Source: Vanhoonacker & Pomorska, op.cit., p. 10 (environment added by author) 
The possibility for the Presidency to shape the agenda in external relations has 
suffered further setbacks as the main tasks (both organisational and agenda-setting) 
                                                 
22 S. Vanhoonacker & K. Pomorska, “The EU Diplomatic System: Who is at the helm?”, Paper 
presented at Workshop ‘The EU Diplomatic System After Lisbon: Institutions Matter’, 
Maastricht, 18-19 November 2010, p. 9. 
23 Kaczyński & ó Broin, op.cit., p. 2. 
24 Vanhoonacker & Pomorska, op.cit., p. 10. 
25 GAC, FAC – Trade, COREPER II, ANTICE, and Preparatory bodies in trade and development 
are still chaired by the Presidency. See Council Decision 16517/09. 
26 Council of the EU, Council Decision laying down measures for the implementation of the 
European Council Decision of 1 December 2009 on the exercise of the Presidency of the 
Council (2009/881/EU)”, Official Journal of the European Union, Annex II, p. 2. 
27 Vanhoonacker & Pomorska, op.cit., p. 10. 
  8 have been taken over by the EEAS. The right of initiative in CFSP matters has been 
delegated to the HR/VP. In areas other than CFSP, the Commission has preserved the 
exclusive right of initiative. As a result, it is expected that the Presidency will no longer 
leave visible marks in foreign policy issues; however, the rotating Presidency is still 
involved to some extent in the process of strategic planning via the trio 
programmes.28  
Consensus-building 
The rotating Presidency enjoyed a very influential consensus-building role under the 
Nice system, before seeing its role as an internal broker somewhat reduced under 
the ToL.29 Nevertheless, it is important to see that these changes once again concern 
primarily the CFSP area where the role of consensus-builder has been taken over by 
the HR/VP and the EEAS. 30  Otherwise, the role of the rotating Presidency as 
consensus-builder remains the same under exclusive and shared competences. 
Consensus-building takes place both within the Council of Ministers and with other EU 
institutions.  
With this change in CFSP matters, the Presidency lost its role both as contact point for 
member states31 and as ‘liaison officer’ among other EU institutions. The Presidency is 
no longer in charge of the FAC preparations, information-gathering and finding 
compromises. The same applies to the European Council, which is led by the 
permanent president. This basically suggests that the only remaining position for the 
Presidency as a chair is in the COREPER II where important decisions are discussed 
(especially horizontal issues)32 before forwarding the dossiers to the ministerial level. 
This allows the rotating chair to exert its influence over the preparations of the FAC 
meetings.33  
The important new Council formation chaired by the rotating Presidency, the 
General Affairs Council, ensures consistency and continuity, the preparations for the 
European Council, the drafting of conclusions and decisions of the European 
Council.34 As the rotating Presidency is still in charge of the chairing and leading of 
the GAC and its working groups, the Presidency thus retains some room for 
manoeuvre at the EU level; however, its real influence remains to be seen.  
                                                 
28 Vanhoonacker & Pomorska, op.cit., p. 15. 
29 S. Vanhoonacker, K. Pomorska & H. Maurer, “The Council presidency and European Foreign 
Policy – Challenges for Poland in 2011”, Warsaw, Center for International Relations, p. 21. 
30 Vanhoonacker & Pomorska, op.cit., p. 12. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Vanhoonacker, Pomorska & Maurer, op.cit., p. 22. 
33 Interview with Péter Balázs, op.cit.; Missiroli & Emmanouilidis, op.cit., p. 2. 
34  Joint Study of European Policy Centre, Egmont & Centre for European Policy Studies, 
op.cit., p. 17-18. 
  9 Besides CFSP issues, one must bear in mind that the rotating Presidency remains in 
charge of nine Council configurations, including that of trade and environment.35 
The rotating chair presides all levels of the Council formations in these fields and, 
according to the Council’s rules of procedure, when trade issues are on the FAC 
agenda, the HR/VP will ask to be replaced by the rotating Presidency. 36 The 
consensus-building role of the Presidency under shared competences does not 
change. 
Despite the many simplifications in the ToL, the multitude of new actors complicates 
the institutional set-up; as a result, the institutional balance is also expected to 
change.37 The HR/VP and the EEAS have also taken over the CFSP role of the rotating 
Presidency in inter-institutional arrangements. Nevertheless, its remaining involvement 
is not to be ignored, especially as the ToL has formalised the operation of the trio 
Presidency system.  
However, the initial phase of the new system faces many difficulties and, until it is 
entirely in place, further problems could easily arise. The main idea behind the 
creation of the EEAS was the need to better coordinate external policies of the 
Commission, the Council and the member states.38 But fragmentation remains, as 
trade, development and enlargement policies belongs to the Commissioner in 
charge rather than the EEAS. These exceptions show that the HR/VP does not have 
exclusive responsibility for the whole scope of the Union’s external actions.39   
The ToL assigns a passive role to the rotating Presidency that greatly depends on the 
attitude of the incumbent in the driving seat.40 At EU level, relations between the 
work of the GAC and the European Council President, and the possible delegation 
of powers41 from the HR/VP, seem to be opportunities to be seized.42  
                                                 
35 Piris, op.cit., p. 235. 
36 Vanhoonacker, Pomorska & Maurer, op.cit., p. 10. 
37  Joint Study of European Policy Centre, Egmont & Centre for European Policy Studies, 
op.cit., p. 189. 
38 R.G. Whitman, “Strengthening the EU’s External Representation: The Role of the European 
External Action Service”, European Parliament, DG for External Policies Policy Department, 
Brussels, February 2010, p. 3. 
39 Ibid. p. 5. 
40  Joint Study of European Policy Centre, Egmont & Centre for European Policy Studies, 
op.cit., p. 156. 
41 This privilege, however can concern other countries as well, not only the rotating President, 
but in general the rotating Minister is the first to contact. Examples occurred already under 
the Spanish presidency when the French Minister represented Ashton in Montreal at a 
conference on aid for Haiti, some uneasiness. Ibid., p. 71. 
42 Ibid., p. 174. 
  10 The European Parliament is the biggest winner of the ToL, both in internal and 
external policy areas.43 Art. 36 TEU states that   
The HR shall regularly consult the European Parliament on the main 
aspects and the basic choices of the CFSP and CSDP and inform it of 
how those policies evolve. He shall ensure that the views of the 
European Parliament are duly taken into consideration.  
It has also become a more influential institutional player while taking a big bite in the 
creation of the EEAS in trying to have a say in policy guidelines.44 Concerning trade 
issues, the European Parliament gained a lot as it has now the right to approve or 
reject international agreements. The Commission and the Council both have to 
consult the European Parliament regularly on aspects of the CFSP as well as CFSP 
issues. 45 Moreover, the European Parliament has to give its consent to Council 
decisions when concluding international agreements.46 
To sum up, we can state that the new system of external relations has created a 
more centralised and Brussels-based form of EU governance.47 Nevertheless,  one 
must take into consideration that the newly nominated permanent chairs co-exist 
with the ‘remnants’ of the old system (COREPER, GAC), which could result in grey 
areas and competition with the Commission (trade, enlargement, development, 
environment issues)48 or with the rotating Presidency that is considered the protector 
of member states’ interests. 49  A high degree of inter-institutional coordination 
therefore seems to be necessary. 
External representation 
The EU’s external representation happens both at high level (summits, conferences 
and international organisations) and at the level of every-day practice (delegations). 
When deciding on external representation, both the former arrangements 
concerning competences and the status of the EU in different organisations have be 
taken into account. 
                                                 
43 Piris, op.cit., p. 235. 
44 Joint Study of European Policy Centre, Egmont & Centre for European Policy Studies op.cit., 
p. 158. 
45  W. Wessels & F. Bopp, “The Institutional Architecture of CFSP after the Lisbon Treaty – 
Constitutional breakthrough or challenges ahead?”, CHALLENGE Liberty & Security Research 
Paper, no. 10, June 2008, p. 14. 
46 J. Wouters, D. Coppens & B. De Meester, “The European Union’s External Relations after the 
Lisbon Treaty”, in S. Griller & J. Ziller (eds.), The Lisbon Treaty; EU Constitutionalism Without a 
Constitutional Treaty?, Vienna, Springer, 2008, p. 184. 
47 Missiroli & Emmanouilidis, op.cit., p. 3. 
48 Ibid. 
49  Interview with Gábor Baranyai, Ministerial Commissioner, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, EU 
Affairs, COREPER I, Brussels, 30 March 2011. 
  11 Now that the EU has legal personality, it can conclude (in case of competence) 
international agreements in the CFSP (Art. 37 TEU) and Common Commercial Policy 
(Art. 207 TFEU) (exclusive EU competence) areas.50 Former cases of the European 
Court of Justice seem to be supportive of broad EU external action, but there are still 
areas where the Union has no competence (no internal action yet or external action 
is not necessary to achieve its objectives) and member states thus remain in 
charge.51  
Changes also concern the appointment of the Union negotiator or head of team. 
Under Nice, the Commission represented the Community in negotiations; yet, with 
the abolition of the pillar system, the nomination mainly depends on the subject 
matter and the competence.52 In trade issues the Commission remains the main 
negotiator; in CFSP, however, the role of the Presidency disappears. Under mixed 
agreements (shared competence) the question is again more complex as the 
Council appoints the head of the team.53 Table 3 summarises the relevant aspects 
for external representation. 
Table 3 – External Representation under ToL 
 
Exclusive EU 
competence 
Shared Competence  CFSP 
Decision-making body  Council formation  Council formation 
FAC, European 
Council 
Possible negotiator of 
international agreements 
European 
Commission 
The Council decides  HR/VP 
External representation 
European 
Commission 
Rotating Presidency, 
HR or Commission 
HR/VP; European 
Council President; 
EEAS 
On the ground  EU Delegation 
Embassy, rotating 
presidency or EU 
Delegation? 
EU Delegation 
Source: Drieskens & van Schaik, op.cit., p. 10 (negotiator added by author) 
Different levels of representation 
High-level representation is led by the heads of state and government and at 
ministerial level.54 According to the ToL, there is not much place left here for the 
former rotating Presidency, but the game will be mainly played among the HR/VP, 
the President of the European Council and the European Commission.55 The main 
                                                 
50 Wouters, Coppens & De Meester, op.cit., p. 169. 
51 Ibid., pp. 179-180, and Interview with Gábor Baranyai, op.cit. 
52 Ibid., p. 181. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Vanhoonacker & Pomorska, op.cit., pp. 15-16. 
55 Ibid., p. 15. 
  12 question to be answered is the role of the Commission which, as the Treaty states in 
Art. 17 (1) TEU, “[w]ith the exception of the common foreign and security policy, and 
other cases provided for in the Treaties, shall ensure the Union’s external 
representation”. In addition, the Commission remains active in sectorial policies, such 
as trade and enlargement, and will be represented by its own Commissioner.56 This 
means an increase in the Commission’s involvement in foreign policy issues. 
At lower levels, the Union will be represented by the former Commission Delegations, 
now transformed into Union Delegations under the auspices of the EEAS and the 
HR/VP.57 These changes in the Delegations’ work also seem to be problematic as 
member states are sometimes reluctant to transfer competences to the EEAS, which 
is also responsible for the overall strategy with third countries. 58  Due to this 
enhancement of competences to CFSP 59 , the rotating Presidency loses its 
representative role both in third countries and international organisations.  
Fading roles of the Presidency under Lisbon 
To conclude, the adoption of the ToL significantly changed the institutional set-up of 
EU external relations, as the Presidency conferred its former tasks to the new actors.60 
Table 4 shows the main changes in role perceptions of the rotating Presidency under 
the Lisbon system.  
Table 4 – The role of the Presidency under ToL 
Level 
 
Competence/ 
Role 
Exclusive –  
Trade 
Shared - 
Environment 
CFSP 
 
Member state  Agenda-shaping Moderate    Powerful  None 
EU - internal 
Consensus-
building 
Moderate   Powerful  None 
International  Representation None  Moderate  None 
Source: author 
The paper puts forward the following hypotheses with regard to the ToL:  
Hypothesis 1 (exclusive competence): The roles of the rotating Presidency remained 
the same with more focus on consensus-building.  
                                                 
56 J. Paul, “EU Foreign Policy After Lisbon”, Center for Applied Policy Research, No. 2, June 
2008, p. 19. 
57 Paul, op.cit., p. 28. 
58 E. Drieskens & L. van Schaik, “The European External Action Service: Preparing for Success”, 
The Hague, Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendhal’, December 2010, p. 
9-13.  
59 Vanhoonacker & Pomorska, op.cit., pp. 15-16. 
60 Emerson et al., op.cit., p. 30. 
  13 Hypothesis 2 (shared competence): The rotating Presidency’s roles partially changed 
under the Lisbon system and have been challenged in external representation. 
Hypothesis 3 (CFSP): The rotating Presidency has lost its roles on all levels of CFSP 
matters. 
The practice of the Belgian and the Hungarian rotating Presidencies will show that 
some room for manoeuvre still exists for the rotating Presidency in the EU’s external 
relations. 
 
The EU Presidencies of Belgium and Hungary 
"Everything is in flux. Nothing is cast in stone. We are in 
transition and it is still trial and error."61 
Having introduced the main roles, competences and changes of the rotating 
Presidency system in the EU’s external relations, the paper now examines the 
practice of the Belgian (second half of 2010) and the Hungarian (first half of 2011) 
Presidencies. The comparison of the two countries is interesting because they share 
many similarities and will help to show that other features have to be taken into 
account when analysing the roles of the rotating Presidency under the Lisbon system.  
Belgium and Hungary in comparison 
When talking about the rotating Presidency under Lisbon, a closer cooperation 
between the trio members is crucial. The trio of Spain, Belgium and Hungary was a 
good mix as they all had their own priorities and managed to co-operate in an 
effective manner.62 However, only the last two members of the trio will be covered, 
since the terms of the Belgian and Hungarian Presidencies constitute a later stage in 
the implementation of  the Treaty and the two countries share more in common. 
Bengtsson states that each rotating Presidency faces uncertainty and complexity 
during its term.63 The type and extent of the problems, however, can change the 
expected attitude of the leader.64 Table 5 shows the main differences and similarities 
of the two countries.65  
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  14 Table 5 – Comparison of the Belgian and Hungarian rotating Presidency 
  
BELGIUM HUNGARY 
 
Domestic environment  Caretaker government  Stable government 
Former experience  12th time Presidency  1st time Presidency 
Expected attitude  Very cooperative  Cooperative 
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Lisbon system  Premature  Premature 
Other actors (EU) 
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External events  No real crisis situation  Crisis – North Africa 
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Source: author 
Domestic attitude, former experience and expected attitude 
Holding the rotating Presidency has always been a demanding task for any country, 
but it also provides an opportunity for gaining political influence and national image-
building.66 As the country at the helm usually comes under the limelight of the media, 
domestic issues also become relevant in terms of expectations. If there is political 
instability in the country, it often risks losing face and consequently losing the trust of 
EU institutions and member states.67 
As for the Belgians, problems occurred concerning the ongoing political crisis. The EU 
had never been led by a caretaker government, for which they were widely 
criticised at the start of the Belgian semester.68 Controversially, Hungary had a stable 
government, but economic difficulties, the change of the government in the middle 
of the preparatory phase, and some controversial political decisions created uneasy 
moments at the start.69  
The degree of experience was clearly higher on the Belgian side, being in the driving 
seat for the 12th time ‘at home’, which also increased the level of effectiveness to a 
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  15 great extent. While Hungary had a lot to learn from EU leadership, as it was holding its 
first Presidency ever and is a newer member state.70  
The ‘patterns of expected behaviour’, defined as roles, depend on domestic, inter-
institutional and external developments. Expected behaviour is mainly determined 
by the perceptions the country communicates (programme) and how the other 
actors expect it to behave. 71 The external relations sections of the Presidency 
programmes show mainly the same attitude highlighting the importance of the two 
new actors and close cooperation with them.72 Nonetheless, a slight difference is 
visible, as Belgium clearly refers to its commitments towards “the smooth application 
of the new measures introduced by the Treaty”,73 while the Hungarian side is more 
reserved by mentioning the possible need for the rotating Presidency’s help.74 
While a cooperative attitude was expected from both sides, it proved much stronger 
from Belgium due to its very pro-integrationist attitude, supportive stance and broad 
Treaty interpretation. By giving such an example, Belgium created and promoted 
precedents which will be difficult to reverse by other rotating Presidencies (lock-in 
effect). 75  However, the aforementioned controversial issues show that a 
considerable amount of tension and vagueness is still in the system resulting in 
quarrels on issues like the Mercury and the Forestry cases (see below).76 
                                                
Challenges, uncertainty and complexity 
Due to internal and external difficulties, both Presidencies had to face critical 
challenges. The premature institutional set-up of the Lisbon system, the economic 
crisis and the vagueness of the relationship with other actors in field of external 
relations required a high degree of flexibility, initiative and self-adaptation. As Table 5 
also shows, the internal problems mainly dominated the Belgian semester when 
facing the challenge of establishing the EEAS.77  
The Hungarian Presidency had similar problems, facing a yet underdeveloped 
institutional set-up and many unpredictable arrangements. 78  An important 
difference is, however, the launching of the EEAS and the appointment of its staff 
both at the EU level and in the EU Delegations. Being inventive and flexible in this 
 
70 Ibid., p. 1. 
71 Elgström, Ole, “The Presidency: The Role(s) of the Chair in European Union Negotiations”, 
The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, vol. 1, no. 2, 2006, pp. 172-175. 
72  Belgian Presidency of the EU Council, EUtrio.be, Presidency Programme, July-December 
2010, p. 46. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Hungarian Presidency, EUtrio.hu, Presidency Programme, January – June 2010, p. 53. 
75 Teló, op.cit.,  
76 Interview with Gábor Baranyai, op.cit. 
77  C. Brand, “Implementation of Lisbon bedevilled ‘by paradoxes'”, European Voice, 9 
December 2010. 
78 Interview with a Hungarian diplomat, Brussels, 7 April 2011. 
  16 new type of cooperation is crucial; nevertheless, it is not without tensions. As 
opposed to the Belgian attitude, the Hungarians seemed to be more competitive in 
these matters, emphasising the importance of the member states’ delegations in the 
biggest centres of international organisations.79  
                                                
On top of the internal ‘institutional chaos’80, external events significantly affected the 
first semester of 2011. Due to the unexpected North African crisis, the EU’s global 
credibility was put at stake.81 These examples show that the two Presidencies were 
both exposed to challenges, uncertainty and complexity, but in a different context.  
In the subsequent sections, the paper analyses cases showing that, despite the 
limitations of the ToL in the field of external relations, there is some room of 
manoeuvre left for the rotating Presidency.  
Case of exclusive competence – EU-Korea Free Trade Agreement  
Hypothesis 1 suggests that the roles of the rotating Presidency remained the same 
with more focus on consensus-building.   
The negotiations of the EU-Korea FTA on the EU level were led by the Belgian 
Presidency and required increased efforts to get the support of all the member 
states. Evaluations of the Belgian Presidency all highlight the importance of the 
agreement where the mediation and leadership of the Belgian diplomats were 
crucial as Mr Van Rompuy was mainly struggling with the European Council 
preparations.82  
Trade issues were generally very important for the Belgian Presidency. 83 It was 
already pinpointed in the programme that coordination of these issues in the FAC will 
continue to be provided by the rotating Presidency.84 The HR also encouraged 
Belgian efforts as the semester was full of other trade-related matters.85 The question 
of the EU-Korea FTA had been on the agenda for a while, but the resistance of Italy86 
and the objections of the car industry87 put the conclusion of the agreement on the 
EU level into jeopardy. Although the negotiations with Korea were led by the 
Commission, the Presidency had a hard time reaching a deal with the member 
states at EU level.88 According to Belgian officials, the negotiations required a careful 
 
79 Emerson et al., op.cit., p. 31. 
80 Interview with Belgian officials, op.cit. 
81 H. Van Rompuy, “Our global credibility at stake”, EU2011.hu, 12 March 2011. 
82 S. Taylor, “Van Rompuy’s summitry fails to convince”, European Voice, 23 September 2010. 
83 Interview with Belgian officials, op.cit. 
84 Belgian Presidency Programme, op.cit., p. 46. 
85 Interview with Belgian officials, op.cit. 
86 S. Taylor, “Pressure on Italy to sign South Korea trade deal”, European Voice, 13 September 
2010. 
87 R. Jozwiak, “Car firms unhappy as Korea talks continue”, European Voice, 12 February 2009. 
88 Interview with Belgian officials, op.cit. 
  17 and intensive approach both at ministerial, COREPER and working group levels.89 In 
addition, the Presidency organised formal sessions with the member states’ trade 
ministers, which usually rarely take place.90  
During the strongly criticised European Council of September 2010 on the  relations 
with strategic partners, the EU-Korea FTA was also on the table of the foreign 
ministers.91 As Italy did not want to drop its objections, the Presidency, in constant 
contact with the Italian side, organised a separate meeting in the margins of the 
summit to get Italy on board as well.92 Thanks to the Belgian efforts, an agreement 
was finally reached in the FAC in the form of a package deal incorporating the 
Italian demand on delaying the start of the agreement for six months and starting in 
July 2011.93 
Due to the changes of the ToL, the European Parliament was granted an important 
role in trade policy, as its approval is now required for concluding of international 
agreements.94 This is why a more intensive dialogue with a more assertive and 
powerful post-Lisbon Parliament was necessary at EU level. This is a clear difference 
to the Nice system.95 With the leadership of the foreign minister of Belgium, Mr 
Vanackere, the Presidency and the European Parliament started to negotiate 
safeguard measures in order to deal with the concerns of the European industry. 
These clauses are included in the FTA and had to be agreed upon before the 
agreement could come into effect.96 Although some MEPs were still unhappy97 with 
the FTA, they did not block the final approval and the 2011 February EP plenary 
voted in favour of the deal.98 
As we have seen, the conclusion of the agreement was not without difficulties, but 
due to the active involvement, the diplomatic experience and consensus-building 
skills of the rotating chair, a successful conclusion of the first FTA under the Lisbon 
system was reached.99 It was also an important signal to Asia that the agreement 
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  18 was reached in the Council on the same day that EU leaders were discussing the 
EU’s relations with its strategic partners.100 
Cases of shared competence – UNEP Mercury, Cancún and UNFF Forestry 
Hypothesis 2 suggests that the rotating Presidency’s roles partially changed under 
the Lisbon system and have been challenged in external representation. 
In order to examine this hypothesis the paper first highlights three cases (UNEP 
Mercury negotiations, Cancún Conference, UNFF Forestry case), which are seen as 
possible test cases 101  for potential future solutions for issues under shared 
competences.102  
Cases of shared competences have often been subject to competition and tensions 
between member states and EU institutions, especially on issues relative to external 
representation and participation in conferences and international organisations.103 
During the interviews, many officials rejected to give inside information on debated 
matters, which constituted a significant limitation for research.  
The ToL aimed at enhancing the EU’s role on the international arena. However, it 
became clear quite soon after its adoption that member states would have some 
reservations about topics falling under shared competences.104 Environmental issues 
are such cases on which the EU does not have the exclusive right to act but various 
internal regulations can be treated as conferred powers. Furthermore, the EU is 
already considered an important global actor in the field of international 
environmental policy, so more active external representation remains in the EU’s 
overall interest. 
UNEP Mercury case 
The UNEP Mercury case (INC) was first raised as a problematic issue under the 
Spanish term, but the final format of negotiations was agreed upon under the 
Belgian and Hungarian semesters and used in the INC-2 in January 2011. The 
negotiations aim at limiting the discharge of mercury into the environment via the 
creation of a binding instrument by 2013 at the latest.105  
The question in this case was whether the EU should exercise its internal competence 
externally and whether this would affect common rules. 106  The Commission 
interpreted the ToL as giving it exclusive competence in Art. 17(1) to represent the EU 
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  19 in non-CFSP matters and head the negotiation team (Art 218.3). Its proposal to be 
the sole negotiator in the matter107 was strongly opposed by the Council, arguing 
that the mandate concerning financial assistance belongs to the member states’ 
competence.108 Therefore, it is the member states who have the right to decide how 
and by whom their external competence will be exercised. 109 In response, the 
Commission brought up the issue of withdrawing the proposal, which would have led 
into a serious impasse, even more so as the possibility to turn to the European Court 
of Justice was also mentioned.110 At that time “[d]ifferences over the mercury talks 
have become so heated that individuals from the Commission and Council have 
been seen arguing over which of them would sit in a particular seat at one 
international meeting”.111  
In the end, the Commission withdrew its proposal and no agreement was reached 
on the issue. However, without a Commission recommendation the Council cannot 
adopt a position; as a result, an EU position was lacking during the conference, 
which constituted a serious loss of face for the EU. 112  T i m e  w a s  n o t  o n  t h e  
Presidency’s side since the Commission’s Directorate General for Environment made 
it explicit that problems “had to be solved by January 2011” until the second round 
of talks (INC-2).113 After long negotiations, the Council stated in December 2010114 
that some parts of the matter are either of shared or exclusive competence, which 
means that both the Union (the Commission) and the member states (Presidency) 
had the right to participate. The decision also refers to the special committee115 of 
representatives of member states which the Commission should consult regularly 
during its negotiations.116 
The second round (INC-2) of the conference was held in Chiba, Japan, in January 
2011. In several preparatory documents for the INC-2, the Commission and the 
member states (Presidency) are mentioned separately for the preparations and 
practical arrangements. As the Hungarian diplomat Gábor Baranyai stated in an 
interview, it was a great success that the decision had finally been reached.117 
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  20 During the negotiations in Japan the Commission and the Presidency were delivering 
statements alternately according to a list stating the preferences and the 
competences.118 Creating this format was not easy and, even during the INC-2, 
many controversial issues appeared as the member states sometimes felt excluded 
from the process. 119  Further preparations for the INC-3 conference with the 
involvement of the Hungarian Presidency, the incoming Polish Presidency and the 
Commission already started in March and the EU would like to “continue playing an 
active and constructive role in the process.”120  
Cancún climate change case 
The Belgian Presidency assessed the situation after the EU’s highly criticised 
involvement in the Copenhagen Summit of 2009 and tried to find ways of 
overcoming the impasse of the talks. The adoption of the ToL gave the possibility to 
re-examine the decision-making system and to start with finding an operational and 
functional format to improve the EU’s external representation and therefore its 
influence in climate change negotiations.121 This was in the interest of the Belgian 
Presidency. In Copenhagen, the negotiations were conducted by the rotating 
Presidency and the Commission.122 The incoming Presidency (as a member of the 
Troika) was also present at all formal and informal meetings. While overall 
responsibility for the negotiations were taken up by the Commission and the 
Presidency, certain specific tasks were delegated to so-called issue leaders 
(volunteering experts from member states).123 With the legal personality of the Union, 
however, the European Commission also has the right to represent the EU when the 
EU has competences without any reference to the rotating Presidency.124 
Nevertheless, a new team was established for Cancún and the Belgian Presidency, 
following extensive debates, negotiated a new format in which the internal 
coordination was ensured by the Presidency, while the Commission and the 
Presidency took the floor during the negotiations behind a common EU 
nameplate.125 As both the member states and the EU would be contracting parties 
to any UNFCC agreement,126 the Belgian Presidency was aware of the fact that this 
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  21 practice would not be easy to implement in the future.127 Problems with the issues 
appeared at all levels (from working groups to COREPER and even higher), showing 
that a ‘one fits all’ solution was not possible.128  
However, some grey zones still remain in shared competences requiring further 
models usually decided upon on a case-by-case basis. The Commission also realised 
that these inter-institutional negotiations are quite complex and controversial, so the 
current state of play is that the Chiba and the Cancún formats are likely to prevail.129 
I t to o k  a l m o s t o n e  y e a r  to  c o m e  u p  w it h  th e s e  m o d e l s,  w h ic h,  h o w e ve r,  c a n  b e 
problematic. The EU’s image and position is in danger as more of these issues are 
likely to appear on the fore; in addition, some member states are not always pleased 
that the Presidency sits behind the ‘EU nameplate’.130  
UNFF-9 Forestry case 
As the models above show, there is still some hope to find possible solutions to these 
delicate issues. The transitional period is, however, filled with further tensions in the EU 
Delegations. 131  The ToL states that all Commission Delegations become ‘EU 
Delegations’ under the authority of the HR and turn into components of the EEAS 
structure.132 This changes again the role of the rotating Presidency, as, even for the 
every-day coordination of the Delegations, the HR and the EEAS are in charge of 
speaking with third countries and of chairing the coordination meetings with the 
member state embassies.133 EU Delegations will also increase in number of personnel 
to fulfil their roles, which, however, can result in the extension of EEAS ‘competences’ 
into fields which do not necessarily belong to the EEAS’s auspices.134 Although the 
Treaty says that the rotating Presidency should help the HR perform these tasks,135 the 
ongoing tensions, especially in the biggest hubs of international organisations such as 
Geneva and New York, do not seem to disappear easily. 136  The ‘UNFF-9 
arrangement’ is one of the most recent examples of these cases. 
The problems with the Delegations mainly appeared under the Belgian and the 
Hungarian semesters as, firstly, the EEAS became operational, and, secondly, the 
common policies of the EU (agriculture and environment in this case) were on the 
table of UN negotiations in forestry.137 As these competences are shared, member 
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  22 states were not willing to give up their roles to the EEAS personnel, pointing out that 
the EEAS has no sui generis power to act in these field and that they also constitute 
cases where the experts from the member states (usually from agricultural and 
environmental ministries) were more competent than ‘only’ general diplomats’.138  
The main clash emerged over the issue of who delivers statements on behalf of the 
EU and who convenes and chairs the coordination meetings, as the EU Delegation 
to the United Nations claimed to have rights for both.139 The rather dominant attitude 
of the EEAS was harshly criticised by most of the member states’ diplomats and led to 
tensions in the EU Delegation between national and EU diplomats,140 especially 
because former negotiations were prepared and led by the rotating Presidencies.141 
In the run-up to UNFF-9 the Legal Service of the Council referred in its opinion to the 
fact that the UNFF-9 covered subjects of national or shared competence, due to 
which the presentation “could be done through the Presidency, EU DEL or any other 
Member State” (in the form of the “EU Team”).142 Therefore, the Legal Service saw no 
obligation for the EU Delegation to represent the EU at the UNFF-9. 143 National 
delegations also started to disagree on the matter, requesting clarifications from 
Brussels on the “EU Team”, the nameplate and the role of speaking for the EU and 
chairing the EU coordination meetings.144 As for the Commission, similar arguments 
have been made. The Commission indicated that the EU is a full participant in the 
UNFF, that EU coordination meetings might be co-chaired by both institutions and 
that in some contexts the EU Delegation experts can conduct informal meetings, 
especially concerning implementation matters.145  
Ultimately, member states chose to support the leading role of the rotating 
Presidency and the EU was represented by the Presidency. Its work, however, was 
supported by the EU Delegation, and Delegation members also spoke on behalf of 
the EU and its member states on issues related to implementation.146 After the 
conference, the Presidency informed the Council of the outcome of the UNFF-9 
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  23 sessions in New York, which “might be deemed as a success for the EU and its 
Member States”.147 
Interpretations of the ToL differ as some say that if there is a need for unified EU 
position, member states should give priority to EU action and let the EU institutions 
work.148 This was the case under the Belgian Presidency, which, even before the 
creation of the EEAS, made it clear that it acts in some cases on behalf of the HR.149 
Some member states, however, contested this view and tried to emphasise the 
importance of the rotating Presidency, and thus the competence of the member 
states.150 Additionally, Belgian officials stated that Belgium followed the community 
way although it became quite clear that others would probably choose different 
practice, 151 which we have seen in the Forestry case and the attitude of the 
Hungarian Presidency. The Belgians wanted to set standards (lock-in issues) and 
m a n a g e d  t o  p l a y  a  g u i d i n g  r o l e  o n  m a n y  i s s u e s . 152  Changing the standards, 
however, is not easy for the upcoming Presidencies; this is the reason why already 
under the Hungarian term, many new conflicting matters appeared on the 
agenda.153 
Having seen these cases, we can state that the rotating Presidency faces new 
challenges in its former external representational role, as the Commission and the 
EEAS strive for more involvement under shared competences. Its agenda-shaping 
and consensus-building role, however, remained and even increased to some extent 
on the EU-level. 
CFSP case – Libya 
Hypothesis 3 suggests that the rotating Presidency has lost its roles on all levels of 
CFSP matters.  
The last case study covers the area of CFSP competence. The Belgian and the 
Hungarian Presidencies gave full support to the work of the EEAS in CFSP matters.154 
Although all actors accepted the Presidency’s subordinate role, the gravity of 
external events, the institutional ‘chaos’ and uncertainty required the support of the 
Presidency as well.155 In the following section, the paper will highlight some issues 
regarding the Libyan crisis and the involvement of the Hungarian Presidency; the aim 
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  24 is not to cover the background and the roots of the North-African crisis, but rather to 
focus on the relationship between the Presidency and the EEAS.  
Active role and flexibility in Libya 
The lack of institutional arrangements and the exceptional external challenges 
required a more active involvement from the rotating Presidency. Although the 
Hungarian Presidency played no explicit role, there were some steps missing from the 
EEAS’s side, which were covered by the Presidency.156 As the situation in Libya was 
very severe, the role of the European Council was extended quite early.157 However, 
from the start of the crisis, the Presidency managed to fill in the gaps and took an 
active and supportive stance with the Commission, the European Council, the HR 
and the EEAS.158  
The most important issue was to ensure the safety and security of EU citizens, which 
was mainly organised by the Hungarian embassy in Tripoli.159 As there is no EU 
Delegation in Libya, the Hungarian embassy represented the EU locally. The role of 
the embassy was crucial for information gathering and evacuation, which obviously 
also enhanced the involvement of the Presidency.160 EEAS officials stated that the 
personnel of the embassy did a “tremendous job on the ground”,161 but it would not 
be appropriate to see its role as an institutional kind162 since their responsibility for the 
representation was purely coincidental. This fact, however, does not reduce the 
merits of the very active involvement.163  
For the evacuation of EU citizens, the European Union’s Civil Protection Mechanism164 
was triggered on behalf of Hungarian Presidency by Foreign Minister János Martonyi 
on 23 February 2011.165 Here, we can see again a very active behaviour from the 
Presidency; nonetheless, it is important to add that the preparatory work was carried 
out commonly by the EEAS and the Commission.166 Although the Presidency report 
states that “the EEAS and the Commission have confirmed support for the Presidency 
in its efforts”,167  it is not entirely clear whether it was in line with the ToL as it is not 
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  25 specified anywhere.168 I n  s p i t e  o f  t h i s ,  E E A S  o f f i c i als shared the opinion that the 
initiative behaviour of the Presidency was important in this case.169 Moreover, “the 
rotating Presidency stayed well within their limits of competences”.170 
The complex nature of the crisis necessitated a comprehensive approach from the 
EU, which meant that other Council configurations also speeded up their 
involvement. As one of the most pressing issues was the problem of immigration, the 
Presidency immediately commenced discussions in the Justice and Home Affairs 
Council in the framework of which the Joint Operation Hermes 2011 was launched.171 
Moreover, the GAC started preparations of the March European Council and 
development ministers also gathered for a meeting with the leadership of the 
Presidency.172 In addition, the EU interior, energy and defence ministers took action 
while the Hungarian Minister of State Enikő Győri visited the Libyan-Tunisian border 
together with the Commissioner for humanitarian aid.173 As a Hungarian diplomat 
stated: “We seized the arising opportunities during the crisis but we were focusing 
mainly on horizontal dossiers.”174 In other words, the Hungarian Presidency did not 
want to reach any specific outcome but rather show a flexible and supportive 
attitude which was positively welcomed.175  
Another achievement related to the work of the rotating Presidency was the quick 
adoption of sanctions during the Transport, Telecommunications and Energy 
Council’s session which was chaired by the Hungarian minister.176 The decision was 
reached in light of the UN Resolution, but also comprised separate EU sanctions to 
implement travel restrictions, an arm and ammunition ban and freezing measures.177 
The promptness and efficiency of the Presidency was appreciated by other member 
states, especially because preparations were conducted in close cooperation with 
other EU institutions.178 Further restrictive measures were also proposed by the working 
groups.179 
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  26 Any role left for the Presidency in CFSP? 
The reduced competence of the rotating Presidency in CFSP matters does not allow 
it to exert much influence.180 Although the general working environment among 
CFSP actors during the transitional period was very hectic, much more emphasis has 
been given to horizontal issues and to logistical assistance from the very beginning, 
already under the Belgian Presidency’s term.181  
As most of the member states insisted, however, the ToL kept the chairing of the 
COREPER II with the rotating Presidency, leaving some opportunity for them to exert 
influence and control over the work of the FAC, the EEAS and working groups.182 
Although the COREPER II is a crucial moment where preparations for the FAC take 
place, its role has substantially changed and other levels of preparations have 
become more important in CFSP matters.183 In addition, the case of Libya also 
showed that the COREPER II level was not the most decisive, but clearly appeared to 
be the lower, working group levels which are all chaired and led by the EEAS.184 
Therefore, the COREPER II is rather a place to pose questions to the EEAS.185   
On the other hand, the role of the Presidency is crucial on the so-called horizontal 
issues (immigration, financial instruments, sanctions, energy etc.) where CFSP meets 
‘former first pillar’ issues that have not yet been discussed by the foreign ministers. 
Inter-institutional relations are also important with the European Council where the 
role of the GAC appears to be essential due to its ability to ensure cohesion across 
EU policies.186 
Soon after the adoption of the ToL it had become obvious that the job of the HR 
would be quite demanding, making assistance to its work highly desirable, especially 
in the uncertain initial moments.187 The EEAS is still in the phase of testing models, 
finding out practices that everybody can follow. In addition, the lack of clarity of the 
Treaty on the arrangements in external representation has allowed the Presidency  to 
remain involved to some extent in the work of the EEAS. 188  For instance, on 
enlargement issues, the Presidency has a more prominent role based on customs 
rather than law, and its role is even more explicit in association and cooperation 
agreements.189 Therefore, according to the Council’s rules of procedure, it is usually 
the task of the rotating Presidency to fill in for the High Representative when the latter 
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  27 is unavailable.190 Examples of these replacements are Association Council meetings 
with Croatia, Israel, Turkey and Montenegro.191 The EU was also represented by Mr. 
Martonyi during the Central-Asia ministerial meeting in Tashkent 7 April 2011.192 Even 
though these replacements are not institutionalized and settled,193 the Presidency is 
“more equal than others” when it comes to these types of arrangements.194 
The supportive attitude of both Belgium and Hungary made it possible for the HR and 
the EEAS to start with the new arrangement and find their leadership role in the EU’s 
system. Neither the Belgians nor the Hungarians tried to contest the leading role of 
t h e  E E A S  i n  C F S P  m a t t e r s . 195 The real problem, however, was with the separate 
system inside the EEAS as the dominant role of the Commission is quite visible, which 
i s  n o t  a l w a y s  w e l c o m e d  b y  o t h e r ,  m a i n l y  b i g g e r  m e m b e r  s t a t e s . 196 Neither the 
Belgian nor the Hungarian Presidency was pushing for more involvement, but both 
used the tools they had at their disposal to contribute to the work of the HR and the 
EEAS under extremely difficult internal and external circumstances. However,  the 
hypothesis is partially contradicted by the fact that the rotating Presidency still has a 
modest role to play at the EU level since issues are still very much interrelated in CFSP 
matters with other Council configurations.  
                                                
 
Conclusion and implications  
“The real success of the Presidency lies in the 
small achievements when we are able to sit at 
the same table with all relevant parties from the 
EU’s side and agree on a new form of 
arrangement.”197 
 
The aim of this paper was to examine the extent to which the rotating Presidency still 
plays a role in the EU’s external relations post-Lisbon. In order to answer this question 
the paper defined the notion of ‘role’ as exercised under the Nice system under 
which the rotating Presidency, among others, took over the roles of an agenda-
shaper, consensus-builder and external representative. Back then, however, the roles 
of the rotating Presidency in external relations were already mainly assigned along 
legal competences. This is the reason why the paper applied a framework of the 
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  28 presidential roles along the lines of competences and observed the changes in light 
of the post-Lisbon structure.  
Scholars argued that the ToL significantly reduced the rotating Presidency’s role in 
the EU’s external relations. The paper, however, pointed out that this statement is 
valid mainly for the field of CFSP, as in other areas of competence (exclusive and 
shared) the rotating Presidency kept its former powers. Although the ToL specified 
and implemented major changes in the roles of the rotating Presidency, the practice 
of the Belgian and the Hungarian Presidencies in 2011 demonstrates that it is too 
early to draw long-term conclusions concerning the role of the rotating Presidency in 
the EU’s external relations.  
The analysis of the cases have shown that, besides the competences, other features 
(attitude, flexibility, environment) have to be taken into account when looking at the 
contribution of the country at the helm. Belgium, as a very experienced and pro-EU 
rotating President, clearly favoured the ‘more EU’ approach in external relations, 
while considering trade an important issue on its agenda. As the areas of external 
relations differ to a great extent, the paper adopted three hypotheses related to 
exclusive, shared and CFSP competences. 
The first hypothesis concerning exclusive competence suggested that the roles of the 
rotating Presidency would not change significantly. This was also confirmed by the 
case of the EU-Korea FTA where the Belgian Presidency took an influential role by 
organising separate formal and informal meetings in order to convince the member 
states in the Council. The mediator (consensus-builder) role had to be more intensive 
as the ToL involves the European Parliament in the conclusion of international 
agreements at the EU level. Therefore, keeping the European Parliament fully 
informed about the process also necessitates a high level of flexibility  from the 
rotating Presidency.  
The second hypothesis referred to the area of shared competence and assumed 
that the ToL challenged the rotating Presidency’s external representative role. The 
paper analysed three very recent cases in the area of environment policy, 
demonstrating that shared competence offers most of the conflictual cases despite 
the ToL’s aim of creating coherence in external representation. Due to the Treaty 
changes and the increasing internal EU power spilling over to the external fora, there 
is a tendency of expanding EU competences. This expansion of power, however, 
can have controversial effects for member states. Although Art. 17(1) TEU suggests 
an enhanced representative role both for the Commission and for the ‘newly 
transformed’ EU Delegations, member states often question the EU’s competence. 
The forestry case is a clear example of this.  
The cases showed that some of the Treaty’s new provisions often result in long 
debates about competences, especially concerning external EU representation. In 
  29 the case of Cancún, the Belgian Presidency was pushing for more EU involvement in 
the negotiations but some objection was palpable on the side of the member states, 
as the EU had no exclusive competence in this area. Despite the success of the 
Presidency in achieving a common EU position, the difficulties of concluding the 
arrangements anticipate complicated prospects for the future. The Forestry case 
highlighted the difficulties regarding the changes in EU Delegations when the 
Council, with the leadership of the Hungarian Presidency, did not approve the 
request of the EU Delegation to deliver statements on behalf of the EU and convene 
coordination meetings.198 These two cases showed that the Belgians preferred more 
EU involvement while the Hungarian approach differed to some extent. Therefore, in 
cases under shared competence it is possible in the future that the attitude of the 
Presidencies might have an important  influence on the outcome of issues similar to 
the ones mentioned above.  
Having experienced these problems, it is very probable that specific arrangements 
will have to be made on a case-by-case basis in order to set up new formats of 
external representation that might challenge the Presidency’s role. The long debates 
concerning the UNEP Mercury case is usually seen as a test case for establishing a 
specific format that will probably be used during future international conferences, 
too.  
The third hypothesis suggested that the rotating Presidency has lost its roles in CFSP 
matters. The paper also confirms that the ToL left very little room for manoeuvre by 
keeping only the chairing role in COREPER II for the Presidency. Therefore, the former 
roles of the Presidency have been fully taken over by the EEAS, the President of the 
European Council and the High Representative. It is worth mentioning that the very 
active participation of the Hungarian Presidency during the Libyan crisis, however, 
was highly appreciated by the responsible EU institutions. Whether we can consider 
the Libyan case as representative in CFSP involvement is questionable but this 
experience reflects an important issue which also shows that in case of high 
uncertainty and underdeveloped institutional set-up, the Presidency’s support can 
have a high added value for the work of the EU as a whole.  
On top of that, the case of Libya directed attention to important features in the field 
of CFSP. Since CFSP issues are very often interwoven with other policy areas where 
the Presidency conducts the various Council configurations, it has a major role to 
play before these issues are transferred to the FAC level. Therefore, the cohesion of 
these issues is difficult to ensure and the Presidency can play a crucial role at EU-level 
arrangements. As the newly formed GAC formation has direct links both with the 
preparations for the FAC and the European Council, the Presidency can establish 
important links with Mr Van Rompuy while supporting his preparatory work. As in the 
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  30 case of Libya, the Presidency was involved in the work of the EEAS and 
demonstrated high-level cooperation, although not in an institutionalised format. 
Despite the lack of competence, we can state that the hypothesis is partially falsified 
as the Presidency can give its support to the work of the HR, the President of the 
European Council and the EEAS, especially during the transitional period when the 
set-up and the clear separation of powers still seem to be problematic. Future 
developments will therefore further depend on the attitudes of the upcoming 
Presidencies and relationship with the HR, the President of the European Council, the 
Commission and the EEAS.  
To sum up the results of the analysis, we can state that the role of the rotating 
Presidency is still influential in the EU’s external relations in the post-Lisbon system. As 
the field of external relations includes also issues belonging to exclusive and shared 
competences, the representative of member state interests remains to be the 
rotating Presidency whose roles, however, have changed. The main decline can be 
observed in the external representative role, showing that the former very powerful 
role (especially in CFSP) has disappeared. The Belgian and the Hungarian examples 
also showed that issues under shared competence have become more controversial 
and therefore can challenge the already moderate role of the rotating Presidency. 
The role of a consensus-builder, however, will remain and a more intensive role in 
exclusive competence is expected due to the enhanced powers of the European 
Parliament. Therefore, keeping and finding compromise with more actors at the EU 
level will be the key responsibility of the upcoming Presidencies under exclusive and 
shared competence. 
As for CFSP, the path-searching of the EEAS still creates problems but, already under 
the Belgian and the Hungarian terms, many arrangements have been cleared up 
and the Presidency understands better where it can support and balance the work 
of the HR and the EEAS.199 The rotating Presidencies chose to stay behind the curtains 
and acted as ‘honest brokers’ without chairing the meetings. Much also depends on 
the Presidency’s attitude: this ‘honest broker’ role can change with countries aiming 
for more influential roles, especially on CFSP issues. There are signs that the Polish 
Presidency, for instance, would also like to play an influential role in CFSP and CSDP 
matters.200   
To conclude, we can state that the Presidency’s ‘changing roles’ have not yet fully 
developed in the post-Lisbon system. Although the ‘transitional period’ could serve 
as a possible modus vivendi for the future, it will most probably not lead to 
permanent solutions in external relations. The rotating Presidency’s role remains; its 
influence, however, is shifted more towards the EU’s internal level, assuming the 
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  31 important role of a consensus-builder in many controversial issues. Flexibility and 
collaborative attitude towards the still premature institutional arrangements seem to 
be both welcome to create an appropriate ‘code of conduct’ among the main 
actors of the EU’s external relations. 
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